Tulsa Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 3

1968

A New Development in Protecting the Right of the Accused to Due
Process at the Pre-Trial Level
Jack Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jack Anderson, A New Development in Protecting the Right of the Accused to Due Process at the Pre-Trial
Level, 5 Tulsa L. J. 330 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss3/9

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Anderson: A New Development in Protecting the Right of the Accused to Due P

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5, No. 3

CRIMINAL LAW: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS
AT THE PRE-TRIAL LEVEL
1
In the recent case of People v. Caruso the California
Supreme Court ruled police lineups must include persons
physically resembling the suspect. The court overturned the
robbery conviction of a defendant who was picked out of a
lineup of five men.

Witnesses to the robbery had only a fleeting glance at
the getaway car allegedly driven by the defendant, and other
lineup participants did not physically resemble the defendant.
The defendant was a large man (238 pounds) of Italian descent
with dark, wavy hair and a very dark complexion. Other
participants in the lineup were not his size, and none had
dark complexion or dark, wavy hair.
There was no direct evidence, other than the identification by witnesses, to connect the defendant with the robbery,
and the California Supreme Court concluded the lineup was
unnecessarily suggestive and conductive to irreparable mistaken identification. At the police lineup the defendant did
not have assistance of counsel, a right subsequently held in
United States v. Wade 2 and Gilbert v. California' to be guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the Federal
Constitution.
Stovall v. Denno4 states that before a defendant may
invoke an exclusionary concept he must demonstrate that
the lineup "resulted in such unfairness that it infringed upon
his right to due process of law".5 Therefore Stovall stands
for the principal that to have been denied the right to counsel
1 ........ Cal. 2d ..... , 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
2 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
4 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
1 Id at 302.
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at a lineup prior to the Wade and Gilbert decisions was not
a deprivation of right to due process.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Stovall,
commented that the deprivation of right to counsel at a lineup should be given retroactive effect as it was in Gideon v.
WainwrightO and in Douglas v California. However, the
California Supreme Court decided Caruso had been deprived
of his right to due process even though the Wade and Gilbert
decisions could not be relied upon.
To understand what affect California's Caruso decision
may have upon future lineup cases we must examine the
reasoning used in recent Supreme Court decisions concerning
protection of a defendant's constitutional rights at the pretrial level. In United States v. Wades it was argued by counsel for the defendant that it was a violation of the fifth, sixth
and fourteenth amendments to allow results of a lineup to
be admitted into evidence when at the time of the lineup the
defendant was not represented by counsel. The United States
Supreme Court dismissed the contention that this was a violation of the fifth amendment guaranty against self-incrimination, citing Schmerber v. Californiag in which the Supreme
Court stated:
"We hold that the privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood
and use of the analysis in question in this case did not
involve compulsion to these ends". 10
Thus noting the lineup involved no violation of Wade's
privilege against self-incrimination, the court then proceeded
6 372 U.S. 335
7 372 U.S. 353
8 388 U.S. 218
9 384 U.S. 757
10 Id at 761.

(1963).
(1963).
(1967).
(1966).
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to the sixth amendment, and based its decision primarily upon
the fact that there was a violation of the right to counsel.
This leads to the question of whether the right to counsel
applies at the pre-trial level. As early as Powell v. Alabama"
it was recognized that the period from arraignment to trial
was perhaps the most critical of the proceedings 12, and that
during that period the accused requires the guiding hand of
counsel 3 if the guaranty is not to prove an empty right. In
Miranda v. Arizona 4 rules established for custodial interrogation include the right to presence of counsel.
It is therefore well established that a defendant has
right to counsel at the pre-trial level. The question raised
in People v. Caruso'5 is whether this right to have counsel
present is, in and of itself, all that due process of law requires
in order to protect the rights of the accused. The California
Supreme Court in Caruso felt having counsel present at a
lineup is not the only factor required to insure the accused
due process of law. The court felt, as was also observed in the
Wade case, a major factor contributing to the high incidence
of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has
been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in
which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for
pre-trial identification. It was further observed in the Wade
decision that once a witness picks the accused at the lineup
the witness rarely retracts identification, and in robbery
cases the lineup presents a particular hazard in that a victim's
understandable outrage may excite vengeful or spiteful motives.
It does not therefore seem unlikely if a case similar to
People v. Caruso'6 reaches the Supreme Court of the United
"1
12

287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id at 57.

13 Id at 69.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
...... Cal. 2d...., 436 P.2d 336, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1968).
16 Id.
14
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